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ABSTRACT

One of the primary concerns of contemporary counseling litera
ture appears to be the self, to what extent it owes its being to free
dom on the one hand, and to environmental influences on the other.
This paper does not pretend to resolve so complex an issue.

It seeks

rather to view the problem x<rithin a philosophical framework which
seems to recognize the rightful prerogatives of both contenders in
the debate, thereby clearing the way for a better understanding of
the vital issues involved.
that of Karl Jaspers.

The philosophical framework proposed is

Within this framework it is proposed that

Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides the adequate pre
condition for self-becoming or Existenz.

This existential self

becoming has decisive implications for the counseling relationship.
Once the counselor has validated for himself the free effecting of
his own selfhood, he is prepared to recognize this right and respon
sibility for his counselee.

The counselee in turn accepts this right

and responsibility for his own Existenz and rejects dependence on the
counselor insofar as he is capable of coming to himself in authentic
self-being.
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FREEDOM AND SELF-BECOMING
IN KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
Clayton B. Ries
University of North Dakota

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Among the widely acknox^ledged concepts basic to the counseling
literature is that of the self.

One of the unsolved problems in self

theory has been the relationship between the self-concept and the indi
vidual self. ^

However, by making use of an existential approach such

as that of Karl Jaspers, this dichotomy can be resolved.

The existen

tial self is both what the individual does, and what he is or is becom
ing.

"I am what I come to be— not what I passively grow into, like

mere living matter, but what I want to be as I come to myself in the
medium of self-reflection."

In this passage from his monumental

Philosophy, Jaspers epitomizes the principal thrust of this study.
The human being freely creates his oxm selfhood as he comes to an
awareness of his ovm potential and responsibility as a person.

Statement of Problem
Self-becoming or Existenz, the term used by Jaspers, involves
for him a confrontation with three fundamental concepts:
historicity and communication.

York:

freedom,

Freedom constitutes the necessary

•'-Ledford J. Bischof, Interpreting Personality Theories (New
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 595.

^C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 516.
^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, trans. by E. B. Ashton, three
volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971), p. 38.
2

3
precondition to the creating of one's self-becoming.

In his own words,

"What the word choice expresses is that in my free decision I am not
only conscious of acting in the world but of creating my own being in
historic continuity."^

Historicity, the second principal concept under

consideration, is also suggested in the just quoted citation.

Its

implications for Existenz are that "A sense of historicity can simul
taneously lend absolute weight to existence, as grasped by self-being,
and keep it in suspension and relative, as mere existence."-'

Finally,

in Jaspersian thought there is no realization of self-being without
communication.

" . . .

the origin of self-being which comes by itself

and yet, in essence, is not of and by itself alone.
It is proposed that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom
provides an adequate precondition for the becoming of Existenz and
results in decisive implications for the counselor and counselee
and their relationship.

One of these is that the counselor recog

nizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to effect freely
his own selfhood, something he has first validated for himself.
Another implication is that the counselee freely accepts this right
and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting dependence on
the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come to himself
in authentic self-being.

Need for the Study
This study is written not without an awareness of the efforts
of other writers who have dealt with the questions of freedom and the
4Ibid., p. 160.
5Ibid., p. 107.
6Ibid., p. 47.
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self and the implications of both for the counseling relationship and
those individuals involved in it.
cific theory of counseling.

Neither is it an attack on a spe

However, in some instances it will be

pointed out how an existential approach might offer a more consistent,
adequate or integral view of man and his situation than usually pro
posed.

More specifically, far from its being inane speculation with

head in the clouds, "Existentialism is an endeavor to understand man
as he really is.

It takes issue with the assumption of science that

to know the essence of man means that we have grasped the reality of
man."7

Delimitations
Whereas self-being ceases in the isolated ego, implying the
need for communication, this study limits itself to a consideration
of what existential freedom brings to the realization of Existenz.
It asks what is required as the absolute precondition for communica
tion between two selves in historic consciousness, as well as the
implications derived therefrom for the counselor and counselee and
their relationship.
References
Primary sources cited in the course of this study are con
tained in the following list of references.

Also included is a work

edited by Schilpp which contains Jaspers' Philosophical Autobiog
raphy and Reply to My Critics, besides various critical essays about
Jaspers.

7 C . Gratton Kemp, Existential Counseling, p. 2, in Existen
tialism, ed. by J. M. Whiteley (Counseling Psychologist, 1971, 2_, 3).

5
Jaspers, K. Existenzphilosophie.
and Co., 1938.
Jaspers, K.

Berlin and Leipzig:

Von der Warheit. Munich:

Jaspers, K. Rechenschaft und Ausblick.
R. Piper, 1951.
Jaspers, K. Reason and Existenz.
York: Noonday, 1955.

W. de Gruyter

R. Piper, 1947.
Reden und Aufsatze. Munich:

Translated by William Earle.

New

Jaspers, K. General Psychopathology. Translated by J. Hoenig and
M. W. Hamilton. Manchester, England: University Press,
1963.
Jaspers, K. Philosophy. Translated by E. B. Ashton, three volumes.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971.
Schilpp, P. A. (ed.).
Tudor, 1957.

The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers.

New York:

Definition of Terms
Since Jaspers' philosophy is characterized by a dynamic flox-7 of
thought, it was judged advisable to consider his basic concepts as an
organic whole by way of an overview rather than list them in isolated
fashion.

On the other hand, Jaspers regarded his philosophical work

not as a system, but as systematically connected and open structure.
Therefore it follows that the concept for him is somewhat indefinite,
pregnant and growing.
Since every philosophical thought is true only in a movement,
and since this movement must be assimilated authentically and
its repetition must be alive in order to remain true, a pri
macy of terminology . . . is catastrophic. . . . The domina
tion by terminology turns philosophizing into that academic
pedantry in which philosophy itself has vanished.®
To gain the proper perspective for a view of Jaspers' philosophy
it must be kept in mind that his philosophizing is primarily and
O
Karl Jaspers, Von der Warheit, p. 428, in Philosophy of Karl
Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.
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essentially a search for Being.

And man's concrete historical situation

is the factor that largely determines the kind of questions asked and
the answers received regarding the nature of that Being.

Philosophy

must make a fresh beginning in each individual, as he confronts his own
insecurity, his own challenges.
and in flux.

As a result it is always in process

It can never be presented in the form of a universally

binding doctrine.
of meaning.

For Jaspers philosophy seems to contain two layers

There is the one of objective truth and consistency XvdLth

empirical fact, and the other which is that of the depth and intensity
of the personal assimilation of this truth.
World is the first concept to be considered.
sense it signifies the totality of being.
general concepts of being:
in-itself.

In-its broadest

Jaspers distinguishes three

being-an-object, being-a-self and Being-

Only the first of these three can become an object of

thought, those objects in space and time including things, persons,
thoughts and ideas.

This level of being constitutes the world in

its narrower sense and is called existence.
Existenz is being-a-self in so far as the human individual
freely determines his own being.

Human existence for Jaspers can

never become an object of knowledge in the same sense in which the
world does.

True, the individual self has a psycho-physical aspect

which is empirical in nature and as such identical in structure with
other selves.

But the self is also more.

As the locus for possible

freedom of thought and action, this self is potential Existenz.
Existential reality cannot be grasped conceptually since it expresses
itself only in its own freedom, a mode not contained within the
empirical categories.

Jaspers, with regard to making oneself an

7
object of thought, even has this to say.

"...

I can become in no

manner the object of my ox-m speculation, I cannot know myself, but have
only the alternative of either reaching self-realization, or else of
losing myself."

Existenz is "the axis around which all I am, and all
Q

that can become truly meaningful for me in the world turns."
Kierkegaard is Jaspers' primary source for the specific content
of the term Existenz, in itself simply a word meaning existence.
No definable concept— xtfhich would presuppose some kind of
objective being— can express the being of Existenz. The
very word is just one of the German synonyms for "being."
The philosophical idea began obscurely, as a mere inkling
of what Kierkegaard's use of the word has since made his
torically binding upon us.-^
Kierkegaard in turn borrowed from Schelling the distinction between Idea
and Existenz.

It xxras the former who once and for all obliterated the

dependence of the concept of Existenz on Hegel's universal Idea, thus
vindicating for this concept those subjective and utterly personal
qualities which Jaspers was later to borrow from him.
Since Existenz, according to Jaspers, cannot really be defined
he makes use of a set of existential categories instead to circumscribe
that term.

Among the principal categories are freedom, historicity and

communication.

These in a sense determine the existential reality in a

manner analogous to that in which the laxre of causality determine empir
ical existence.
Existential freedom and Existenz are in actuality txro sides of
the same reality and are almost interchangeable concepts for Jaspers.
This idea seems to emerge clearly in the following citation.

9Ibid., p. 76.

In Schilpp, op. cit., p. 99.

■^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy I , p. 56, note.
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My resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer
merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom in
which I can no longer separate the choice and me because 1_
am this free choice . . . freedom is the choice of my own
self. This is why I cannot step out once again to choose
between being myself and not being myself, as if freedom
were nothing but a tool of mine. I am be choosing, rather;
if I am not, I choose not. What I am myself is left open,
of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent
I am not y e t . H
What Jaspers seems to be saying is that the exercise of one's freedom
need not result merely in a series of decisions concerning disconnected
or insignificant happenings.

No, the exercise of freedom is the sole

and adequate source of self-becoming or Existenz.

In fact, free choice

is one's Existenz.
Historicity expresses more than any other concept Jaspers' devi
ation from traditional philosophy.^

For Jaspers it signifies both the

limitation and the dimension of depth which attaches to man's being-in
time.

Historicity is that quality of Existenz that denotes the unity

of the individual, as well as for personal human existence within the
empirical world.

Analytical thought tends to separate Existenz from

its concrete historical situation, while this situation is in fact the
only mode for its appearance.

Freedom too becomes real only through

its bond with the body and with the world.

Historicity is moreover

the medium in which communication transpires.

Jaspers gives expres

sion to all this:
Something quite different is the existential historic con
sciousness proper, in which the self becomes aware of its

-^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.

■*-^Kurt Hoffman, Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy, in
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York:
1957), p. 101.

Tudor,
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historicity as the only reality it has. . . . It makes me axrare
of myself in communication with other historic self-being; I as
myself am phenomenally bound in time to a sequence of singular
situations, my given situations.13
Existential communication is for Jaspers the sole means for the
realization of self-being.
Existential communication is not to be modeled and is not to
be copied; each time it is flatly singular. It occurs between
two selves which are nothing else, are not representative, and
are therefore not interchangeable. In this communication,
which is absolutely historic and unrecognizable from outside,
lies the assurance of selfhood. It is the one x^ay by which a
self is for a self, in mutual creation. The tie to it is a
historical decision on the part of a self: to void its self
being as an isolated I and to enter into communicative self
being. 1^
Difficult as it is to recognize existential communication as such, the
forms it may take Jaspers acknoxtfledges are as diverse as the ordinary
modes of communication among humans.
The Encompassing is that concept whereby Jaspers attempted to
provide a vantage point from which to philosophize out of the totality
of being.

Its point of departure is the thought that whatever becomes

an object of one's thinking is only one conceivable kind of being among
others, only one mode of being.

One cannot reach a position from which

to view the closed whole of being, a position that no longer points to
something beyond.

Being remains forever unclosed for the thinking mind

and keeps drawing it ever onward into the horizon on all sides.
We always live and think within a horizon. But the very
fact that it is a horizon indicates something further
which again surrounds the given horizon. From this sit
uation arises the question about the Encompassing. The
Encompassing is not a horizon x^ithin which every

U K a r l Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 104-105.
l^lbid., p. 54.
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determinate mode of Being and truth emerges for us, but rather
that within which every particular horizon is enclosed as in
something absolutely comprehensive which is no longer visible
as a horizon at all.-^
As soon as it is thought, the one Encompassing splits into its
seven modes.

First there is the Encompassing in which the x^orld or

external being appears, and the Encompassing which the thinking individ
ual is, which is consciousness-at-large or consciousness of empirical
knowledge.

Next the individual is also concrete and temporal existence

and the carrier of that consciousness-at-large.
so far as ideas guide and unify his life.

Then he is spirit in

Finally the Encompassing

undergoes a third split involving a double leap.

One is from the

world to Transcendence, the other from existence to Existenz.
The Encompassing is that vehicle of thought that enables things
to become more than they are on their surface, an added quality that
empowers them to take on their unique transparency and depth.

But

despite this cumulative impulse and thrust, knowledge is for Jaspers
still radically unable to reach Being-in-itself.

The moment one

believes he has grasped Being conceptually, ha has already falsified
it by making it into an objective content, which by definition it is
not.
However there is a mode of knowledge proper to Encompassing
Being.

One becomes ax^are of it, rather than cognizes it directly.

Something of itself non-objective is first thought in the form of an
objective entity, but which acts merely as a catalyst and bridges the
gap leading from the objective knowledge to the awareness of Beingin-itself in a reflexive thought.

Jaspers here seems to draw attention

•'"'’Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 52, trans. by by
William Earle (New York: Noonday, 1955), p. 52.
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to the fact that there must be a direct givenness of Being, prior to
all thought about Being, at the source of all thought and at the
foundation of all knowledge.

Without that primal awareness knowledge

remains for him a superficial collection of data.

With it everything

that is known objectively can be blended into an awareness of Being.
Transcendence is "The source and the goal, both of which lie
in God and out of whose depths alone we really become authentically
h u m a n . A c c o r d i n g to Jaspers Transcendence is the philosopher's
name for God.

Together with Existenz it embodies one of the two

polar concepts of Jaspersian philosophy.

Existenz is directed to

Transcendence which surpasses the individuality of Existenz, appear
ing only where the empirical and intelligible give way.

Being-in-,

itself encompasses Existenz, xrtiich is aware of it and participates
in it.

In this way individual historical truth is included in and

enveloped by the truth of Being and its subjectivity resolves itself
in the affirmation of a transcendent reality.

The absoluteness of

Existenz gives way before an ultimate non-subjective Being, which is
Transcendence or Being-in-itself.
Nevertheless, since knowledge is unable to attain a direct
grasp of Being, for Jaspers the realm of Transcendence can only be
dealt xriLth in the language of symbols, xtfhich he calls ciphers.
World, Existenz and Transcendence are the three ideal realms of
being.

Conceptually distinct, they are ultimately bridged by the

concept of historicity.

The xrorld and the self are thus connected,

the world as the ground for the freedom of the self and the self as

l^Karl Jaspers, Rechenschaft und Ausblick, p. 264, in
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor,
1957), p. 96.
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accepting and assimilating the world.

The concept of the cipher leads

similarly from the world through its appearances to Transcendence.
Philosophical faith, declares Jaspers, is man's only genuine
response to and bond with Transcendence.

Its sole alternative is

abdication of one's selfhood and surrender to nihilism.

Within his

own personal and historical situation, the individual as Existenz is
confronted with a most basic and extreme decision, whether in the
anguish of boundary situations he will keep faith with Transcendence
and in his own selfhood and independence.
If thinking philosophically means: learning how to die, it
does so not by abandoning the present in fear and with
thoughts of death, but by intensifying the present through
never ending activity in the light of Transcendence. Hence,
Transcendence means nothing to us if everything that is, is
merely "a form of life" for us; and likewise, Transcendence
is everything to us if that which is essential to us is so
only in relation to Transcendence, or as a symbol of Tran
scendence. ^
Boundary situations are

;

Situations like the following: that I am always in situa
tions; that I cannot live without struggling and suffering;
that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die— these are what
I call boundary situations. They never change, except in
appearance. There is no way to survey them in existence,
no way to see anything behind them. They are like a wall
we run into, a wall on which we founder. We cannot modify
them; all that we can do is to make them lucid, but with
out explaining or deducing them from something else. They
go with existence itself.™
There can be little more to add by way of saying what the boundary situ
ations are.

What is decisive is Ik w the individual rises to meet these

boundaries of empirical life.

The response may be indifference, escape

•^Karl Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie, p. 71, in Philosophy of
Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.
-^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 178.
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or helpless dejection,
. . . but in the end we can do nothing hut surrender. The
meaningful way for us to react to boundary situations is
therefore not by planning and calculating to overcome them
but by the very different activity of becoming the Existenz
we potentially are; we become ourselves by entering with
open eyes into the boundary situations. . . . To experience
boundary situations is the same as Existenz.-^

Design and Organization
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II takes up the con
cept of the self or self-becoming through its stages from initial awak
ening to full realization in Existenz.

Then in Chapter III, the concept

of existential freedom is considered from the standpoint of the function
of the will, followed by a review of freedom in itself and in its rela
tion to existence, necessity and Transcendence.

Chapter IV, after devel

oping the situational concept of historicity, in this context brings
together the key concepts of Existenz and existential freedom and views
them in their mutual complementation.

Finally, Chapter V considers the

implications of the previous chapters for counseling theory.

•^Ibid. , p. 179.

CHAPTER II

EXISTENZ:

ITS AWAKENING AND FULL REALIZATION

Introduction

Implicit in the essential forward thrust of this chapter i s •the
answer to a vital question.

That question is whether the being of the

world, existence, the object of consciousness-at-large, is all there
is.

Jaspers asks it this way:
What is there, as against all mundane being? . . . We answer:
there is the being xtfhich in the phenomenality of existence is ■
not, but can be, ought to be. . . . This being is myself as
Existenz. . . . In Existenz I know, without being able to see
it, that what I call my "self" is independent. The possibil
ity of Existenz is what I live by; it is only in its realiza
tion that I am myself.1
This specific concept of the self is not Jaspers' exclusive pro

perty, however.

As Wallraff attests, "The . . . idea of an innermost

and uninvestigable self— a hidden source beyond experience which all
experience presupposes— is widely shared."

2

Therefore this chapter

will attempt to clarify or elucidate, to use Jaspers' term, self
becoming or Existenz.

Its method is first of all to consider, within

the framework of the concept of the Encompassing, the possible but
still incomplete answers to the question of self-being.

Then it

1
Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, P- 3.
^Charles F. Wallraff, Karl Jaspers, An Introduction to His
Philosophy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970),
p. 97.
14
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takes up self-reflection, the medium in which self-being can be either
realized or lost.

Finally it reflects on the paradoxical expressions to

which Existenz gives rise.

In them self-becoming is clothed in human

language which at once partially clarifies and partially obscures its
meaning.

Incomplete Expressions for the Being of Existenz

I at Large
The first of these incomplete expressions of self-being is 1^ at
large, a composite term that must be viex<red in the light of conscious
ness at lajrge within the total framework of the concept of the EncomIn this term _! is the being that grasps itself, that makes

passing,

itself an object of knowledge.

Thus the I is in a subject-object

dichotomy, but not in a radical one like its division from things in
The _I is aware of itself in a kind of circle with itself.

the world.

How can the _I grasp itself?

It can do so only as a thinking subject,

as that which constitutes the core of all self-consciousness.
_I think the

grasps itself as identical with itself.

In this

"At the moment

of thinking, the _I as _I think is sure of its existence in the world.
It does not knoxv what it is, but at its present time it does know that
it is.'"'

Such an I at large the individual is, just as is the case

with every other.
himself.

But the individual is not on3.y I at large, he is

The I think does not constitute his self, since it is only

an A at large.

He is simply posited in it as a point-like subject

drained of himself.

Lacking any substance, it expresses only one's

self-consciousness as one being among others.
'^arl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 27.
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Aspects of the I, or Four Reflections
of the Individual's Existence
Inability to find oneself in the I_ ajt large may lead one to turn
to his concrete existence.

Here he is not only aware of himself, he is

aware of himself under different aspects, as in so many mirrors.
of them, however, does he see himself entirely.

In none

He perceives sides of

his being and to some extent identifies with them, but does not achieve
a full identity with himself in any.
When one says _I what does he mean?
to his body.

First of all he is referring

Without it he cannot act, and likewise he has to suffer

whatever befalls it.

He forms a unity with it.

Its vitality or lack of

it makes him feel strong or weak, ill at ease or glad to be alive.
Although he remains one with his body, he seems to stand apart from it
at the very instant he experiences it.
lish identity.

He is not his body.

This unity still does not estab

If he were his physical 3^, it would

be incongruous that some body parts were not essential to him.

He can

lose limbs, various organs, even parts of his brain, yet remains himself.
He may be present in the body’s vital functions, but those functions are
not his self.

In last analysis his physical 1^ is in his hands.

Yet even

if he takes the extreme measure of taking his own life to demonstrate his
refusal to recognize his body as one with himself, he can only kill it,
his body.

Even then he must ask if henceforth he will be simply nothing.

When one rates in the context of social life is another aspect
or mirror of the I_.

One’s professional functions or job, the effect he

has on others evokes a picture of what he is.
is what he is for others.

He comes to feel that he

To be at all, everyone needs not only a body

but a society, even if he stands outside or against society. The social
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so dominates people that a man's nature will seem to change along with

changes in his social position and in the people he associates with.
a social 1^ however, he is not himself either.

As

Although it is imposed

on him, he can still put up an inner resistance to it.

Throughout all

changes he can remain himself, regardless of any social loss or gain.
In his social existence he can be conscious of a role which he plays.
But to him his role and his 1^ are two different things.

He knows him

self only in his role, and yet he is not identical with it.
Society moreover rates one according to what he does.
this constitutes a new mirror of what he is.

To him

What he has accomplished,

what he can see as his success, his work, or what strikes him as his
failure or wrongdoing, all this objectifies him to himself in its own
fashion.

In the active

sense of achievement.

I

his sense of being seems to merge with his

But here again he is not merely what he achieves.

He can even come into conflict with it, or reject it as something no
longer congruous with his ever changing demands on himself.

What was

once his achievement may turn itself into a thing from which he detaches
himself.
I myself— while relatively acknowledging my works as mine
and keeping faith with myself in upholding them— avoid
identifying with them, especially as they seem to rob me
of myself when I sense future possibilities, and when my
present goal is what can make me sure of myself.
Finally, it is by his past that one knows what he is. What he
has been and experienced, thought and done, how he has been helped or
what he has been made to bear, all this determines what he is conscious
of being now, whether it is presently unknown or consciously remembered.

4 Ibid., p. 31.
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This is also where he derives his self-respect of his self-contempt, as
well as the sympathies and antipathies that move him.
I

This reminiscent

will objectify him to himself by mirroring his past to him.

if he identified with this reminiscent

I

However,

he would lose himself.

He

would be setting up the past as a criterion of what he wants to be,
thereby depreciating both the present and future and their possibil
ities.

Then he would not be what he becomes, but rather what he

believes he has been.

Thus his very concept of the present and the

future will be as if they already were in the past.

A decision in

the present can once again unfold or wither the sense and signifi
cance of memory.
Four aspects of the 1^ as holding out possible answers to the
question of the nature of Existenz have been considered.

But what was

discovered was a schematization of objective existence, not an adequate
statement of self-being.

In each, one could find himself in the schema,

but each time he had the experience that it did not fit entirely.
"None of these objectivations will achieve an absolute identity with
myself.

I go beyond such schemata; in them I would be bound to lose

myself.

Character, the Encompassing's Third
Mode Response to the Question of
Self-Being
When one asks once more what he is, he wants to know what is for
him the being underneath his phenomenal or outward self.

He has no

direct way of knowing the kind and quality of his own being-in-itself,

5Ibid., p. 32.
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but he infers it is that which underlies all his phenomena.

One day he

will have the experience that he not only exists and cannot be whatever
he would like to be, he also finds himself the way he is.

He may be

amazed or ashamed, terrified or captivated to learn from his actions how
he is.

Throughout his life he experiences a dependency upon a being of

himself he cannot fully control, a being he directs, promotes and
restrains.

It is a being too which may become for him a meaningful

object of psychological research.

This being is his character.

Yet

there is still something in him that resists recognition of himself as
being simply given the way he is.
that way.

He may even be disturbed in being

Although he may not know how to change it directly, he does

know he is free.

"I retrieve myself from the very being-in-itself that

would make me resemble a given thing, and out of this given state, or
against it, I take up myself."^
Three responses to the question as to the nature of Existenz
have now been heard.

The individual said 31 in three different senses

but each sense was only a mode of his _I, not his intrinsic self.
for him there is not yet a totality of what he is.

Thus

He comes up against

limits in the I _at large, in the aspects of the J[, and in the way he is
due to his character.

Indirectly, nevertheless, the thoughts he cannot

avoid in his efforts to objectify himself x^ill provide a degree of lucid
ity.

First, he takes note of the shortcoming each time.

to him still.

There is more

Then, in his self-retrieval from all objectivity, although

illuminated by it, what has been thought each time will be excluded from
himself.

The result is an indirect knowledge about himself, rather than

a knowledge of himself.

^Ibid., p. 33.

"The self is more than all I can know."^

^loc. cit.
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Self-Reflection as the Medium for Realizing Existenz
It has just been pointed out how the individual retrieves him
self from the 1 of consciousness at large, from the profusion of aspects
in which he appears empirically to himself, and from his character as
the given way he is.

In this retrieval is implied an acting on oneself

suggesting the origin of a new self-comprehension.

He has examined what

he is, impersonally and objectively, and finds nothing more than an.
abundance of ever-particular facts.

But he goes on to examine what he

is intrinsically and he sees that his self-being is still up to him.
When he says JL myself, he no longer relates to himself merely contem
platively, but effectively.

In actively dealing with himself he now

finds the potentiality for authentic being, for Existenz.

And since it

is only potentiality accounts for there never being an end or a comple
tion in time, why he does not know himself and is sure of himself only
by becoming himself.
Self-reflection then is a new way to pose the question of self
being.

Its aim is no longer mere self-knowledge.

a spur to come to oneself.

No, the question is

In existential self-reflection the individ

ual looks for himself as emerging from his judgment on himself.

This

judgment involves a seriousness incompatible with that curiosity about
oneself that underlies judgments made in consciousness at large.

Know

ing oneself does not mean looking at oneself as in a mirror, but working
on oneself so that he will become who he is.

"In self-reflection I turn

back from things in the world, back to myself, to my actions, to my moti
vations and emotions, to examine whether they are what I am myself and
what I want to be."^

^Ibid., p. 36.
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Essentially self-reflection is not an end but a means.
ters each time is that and how one emerges from it.
not self-study but self-communication.
nition but as self-creation.

What mat

Self-reflection is

One does not realize it as cog

Whenever one reflects upon himself he is

for a moment both no longer and not yet himself.

At that instant he is

his potential in the point that separates his state of unconcern and
his entering the door to his own intrinsic originality.

Finally, the

impulse behind the self-reflection in which one passes from one judg
ment to the next, making distinctions and analyzing, is his will to
have one decision originate.

His resolve to put an end to self

reflection is thus an expression of self-being, a means of encounter
with the self.

Paradoxical Expressions of Self-Being
The first of these antinomical statements is that one becomes
himself only as he overcomes himself.

Empirically he could conceive

his being as his character, as the way he happens to be.
character does not constitute his intrinsic self.
rather that he has and relates to.
blindness of a given fact.

But his

It is something

The being of his character has the

Through struggle alone does he transform

it into a freely willed being in which his self unfolds, the self for
which he takes responsibility.
. . . in phenomenality there is no truthful I without
self-conquest. I discard shells of my self, the ones
I judge to be untrue, in order to gain my more profound,
my intrinsic, my infinite, my true self. To come to my
self as I perish is the phenomenon of self-being.^

^Ibid., p. 44.
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Self-being and self-conquest in self-reflection may turn into an
endless circle.

Although one’s existence in the world provides footholds

for breaking out of this circle, he is enabled to break through it only
by Transcendence.

This is the second paradox.

Self-being is the union

of two opposites, of standing on one's own feet and of yielding both to
the world and to Transcendence.

One comes to Existenz by participating

in his active world, only by being involved in his spatial and temporal
existence.

And just as he does not come to Existenz apart from the

world, he cannot come to himself without Transcendence.
. . . I am conscious of my Existenz only in relation to the
Transcendence without which I slide into the void. When I
see myself in the phenomena of existence, I never see my
true self; Transcendence alone lends to all finite phenom
ena a weight they could not have as mere existence. u
By way of summary, this chapter has considered three basic
approaches to the problem of self-being or Existenz.

First, in 1 at

large, aware of itself as a thinking subject, the _I is conscious that
it has being in the world.

Its shortcoming is that this thinking I .

is not oneself, it simply constitutes his self-consciousness as one
being among others.

A further step along this first approach was to

search for self-being in the four aspects of one's concrete existence,
in the physical jC, the social 1_, the active I_, and the reminiscent 1.
But what one discovered here xjere four objectivations of one's exist
ence, rather than adequate statements of self-being.

Nor did character,

as that which underlies one's outward self, provide the answer.

There

was still something that resisted taking himself as merely given the
way he is.

These first three responses did provide, nevertheless, an

10 Ibid., p. 46.
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indirect knowledge of Existenz.

The second basic approach was a consid

eration of self-reflection as the medium, for the realization of self
being.

It results in self-communication which serves as the impetus for

self-becoming.

Finally, the third basic approach consisted in looking

at two paradoxical expressions for the being of Existenz.

Much as in

the first approach, their function is seen primarily in terms of pro
viding a kind of indirect knowledge of self-being by way of the clash
between two apparently mutually contradictory statements.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND EXISTENTIAL SELF-BECOMING

Introduction

Why raise the question of freedom in relation to the being of
Existenz?

Because for Jaspers there is no Existenz, no self-being for

the individual as he is in mere empirical existence.
freedom alone that he achieves selfhood.

It is through

"In my free decision I am

. . . conscious of . . . creating my own being . .
Freedom exists as volition.
the exercise of the will.

It comes to realization through

Therefore this chapter will take up first

the problem of free will in order to determine its relevance to the
question of freedom.

Then the concept of freedom itself will be con

sidered, in its existential elucidation and in its relation to exist
ence, necessity and Transcendence.

The Problem of Free Will
Propositions proclaiming the freedom or unfreedom of the will
have long engaged in battle under the names of determinism and indeter
minism.

It was almost as if man's being were hanging on a theoretical

decision.

What is often overlooked is that the object of this struggle

is not what freedom was originally all about.
will help clarify the issue.

•^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.
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Possibly some examples
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One of the assertions about freedom understands free to mean
without cause.

Regarding the question of free will this would take the

form of saying that in case of two equally strong possibilities, if any
thing at all is to happen, one possibility must be strengthened so as
to be' realized by choice rather than by necessity.

This argument seems

to show freedom more as coincidence and arbitrariness rather than as
freedom proper, however.
Another assertion is one in which free xvill is defined psycho
logically as freedom of action without disturbance from outside.

This

can be thought of as a psychological freedom to act insofar as onefe
intentions can be undisturbedly translated into reality, and to choose
by making a calm and orderly selection from the possibilities one is
aware of.

Conceiving free will in this manner seems plausible enough

in its objectivity but disappointing in its lack of substance. But it
does not seem to answer the question of free will as it does not deter
mine precisely that will whereby one assumes responsibility for his own
self-being.
Nevertheless, this psychological view does touch the borderline
of freedom proper when one asks whether he has an inner freedom of voli
tion itself, beyond the externally qualified freedoms of action and
choice.

In choice and in action the motives and goals one chooses from

must already exist.

The questions that arise then are, can one freely

choose the kind and content of his motives?
the standards that govern his selection?

And can he freely choose

Is he moreover responsible

for the kind of person he is, for his character?
have another will as well?

Could he possibly

Such questions appear beyond the scope of
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the empirical psychologist and must look instead for indirect existen
tial clarification.
A third objective freedom attributed to the will concerns human
relationships in society and in the state.

From a sociological stand

point personal, civil, and political freedom can be distinguished.

The

personal one requires only the possession of economic means to be free
even in the absence of political and civil liberty, as in one of the
modern dictatorships.

Civil freedom obtains even in a state of politi

cal unfreedom if the law assures equal protection.

The political one

allows every citizen to participate in the selection of his leaders.
Their existence in general cannot be doubted, but it does not answer
the question about freedom and Existenz.

The presence of these free

doms does not assure the realization of Existenz, nor would their
absence make its realization impossible, although its exercise would
be restricted.
Thus psychological and sociological freedoms are never freedom
itself, but they are not irrelevant to it.

The individual who knows

he is free is aware that they are conditions of the appearance of free
dom in existence if he wants realization in the world, and not merely
possibility and internality.
The fight between determinism and indeterminism will continue
as long as objective arguments are used to settle the nature of free
dom.

In this fight both sides lose sight of true freedom.

On the one

hand whatever objective evidence is presented for or against it is open
to refutation.

On the other, it rests on the assumption that the being

of objects in the world exhausts the totality of being.
neither demonstrable nor refutable.

"Freedom is

This is what Kant meant by calling
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it ’inconceivable" and viewing the conception of this inconceivability
as the limit of our insight."

In any case, determinism and indeter

minism place the entire matter on the wrong plane.

One side asserts

freedom's existence while falsely objectifying and thus voiding it in
fact.

It is a defender of freedoms that do not really amount to free

dom, thus turning its very success into an unconscious denial.

The

other side denies freedom but applies the word to an objective phan
tom.

Jaspers believes both sides are in error.

They regard objective

being as the totality of being, with the result that freedom eludes
-5
them.J

Conceptualizing Existential Freedom
In every kind of questioning there is a sense in which the kind
of question asked and the mode of the answer somehow relate to the ques
tioner.

But when one asks about freedom his potential self-being is both

what asks and what answers.

He is asking whether and how he takes hold

of himself or lets himself go.

He is not looking about him to see

whether freedom is out there somewhere in the world.
far as he is involved in his own question.

He is asking inso

Without the possibility of

being free himself he cannot ask about freedom.

Hence there is either

no freedom at all or it is already in asking about it.

What makes him

ask is an original will to be free, so that his freedom is anticipated
in the fact of asking.
of its possibility.

He wills it because he was conscious beforehand

And freedom finally is proved by his actions,

rather than by his insight,

^Ibid., p . 150.
Loc. cit.
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Yet to say that one might be free is to say that he might also
be unfree.

The agonizing fact that this might be the case is what could

be called the negative impulse of freedom.
the possibility of being unfree.

As self-being he cannot bear

Because things that depend on him can

be of absolute importance to him, he must be able to be free.
not a conclusion he draws from any facts or conditions.

This is

It is the

expression of his very self-being, of his awareness of his own poten
tial, of being still in a position to decide about himself.
Freedom, according to Jaspers, is the beginning and end of the
elucidation of the being of Existenz.
tive characteristic.

It constitutes its most distinc

As a preliminary step to conceptualizing this

existential freedom, freedom as knowledge, as arbitrary act and as law
will be shown to be indispensable conditions, but not its essence.
Then follows a consideration of freedom as idea, choice and respon
sibility.

Finally, after attempting to clothe existential freedom in

conceptual language, it will be viewed in relation to existence,
necessity and Transcendence.

Freedom as Knowledge, as
Arbitrary Act, as Law
Whatever merely exists or happens in the world is unfree, is
determined.

The individual too finds himself in this existence.

he is not just a sequence of events.

But

He knows that he has existence.

He does something and he knows what he is doing.
everything that lives, but he knows he has to die.

He has to die like
His knowledge of

what is taking place necessarily does not free him from any necessity,
but it lifts his consciousness beyond mere necessity.

To be involved

himself, to understand the things he must do, is a moment of freedom.
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Knowledge does not make him free, but without knowledge there can be no
freedom.
Through knowledge the individual can see a range of possibil
ities.

From these he can choose from among the several he knows.

Where

several things are possible for him, the cause of what will occur is his
arbitrary act.

To be sure, he can try to understand this act as a neces

sary occurrence.

His choice depends upon his mode of knowing, and he can

trace the way this came about.

His choice likewise depends on observable

psychological drives among which the strongest motive prevails.

And yet

he can neither deduce the nature of the arbitrary act nor, with the rigor
of causal insight, prove or predict any factual decision as necessary in
a given case.

Even if he turns his decision into what appears to him

mere accident, by flipping a coin for example, the arbitrary element
remains because he voluntarily places himself in a state of passiye sub
mission to chance.- What seems random or haphazard is really a sponta
neity coincident with his freedom and working through arbitrary deci
sions.

As x-?as the case with knowledge, arbitrariness does not amount

to freedom, but without an arbitrary act there is no freedom.
But suppose one does not knowingly make an arbitrary decision.
He may decide not at random but in accord with a law he recognizes as
binding.

He is free then since he is bowing to a norm he found within

himself, a norm he could as well not bow to.
able necessity to which he is subject.

A law is not an inescap

It is a necessity only in the

sense of constituting norms of action and motivation with which he can
either comply or not comply.

When he finds these norms to be mani

festly binding upon him, in recognizing and obeying them he is aware
of his free self.

While acknowledging things that are necessary and

30
valid for him, he realizes they may not be necessary in themselves.
Because the norms are identical with the exigencies of his own self,
he feels they are self-evidently valid.

This freedom, in which one

freely finds himself by obeying valid norms, is active as opposed to
mere passive knowledge.

It is also sustained by a necessity as

a gainst the randomness of arbitrary acts.
that of knowledge and of the arbitrary act.

This freedom includes
As there can be no

freedom without those two, there is no freedom without law.

Freedom as Idea, as Choice,
as Responsibility
Man thus moves toward freedom by an ever broadening orienta
tion within his world, by a limitless visualizing of premises and
possibilities of action and by allowing all motives to speak to him
and work within him.

But this aggregate of many parts will bring

forth freedom only insofar as everything will not just factually tie
in with everything else but will do so for his consciousness as the
center of possible Existenz.
idea.

This is what is meant by freedom as

The more the self creates order out of this endless diyersity

of accumulated motives and elements of orientation, the freer one
knows he is.
In spite of that, whenever one decides and acts, he is not a
totality or an idea but an

in concrete, given circumstances, in a

situation that is specific and particular.

In fact, one could never

act at all if he wanted to wait for that totality to evolve as he
tries to envision all premises and possibilities.

The first conse

quence of this tension between the unfinished idea and. the need to
live, to choose, to decide at a certain time, now or never, is a
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sense of unfreedom in being tied to time and place and having one's pos
sible probes and safeguards narrowed down.

But then he experiences this

definite choice as not just a negative and unfree thing he must do with
out completing his ideal totality.

It is this choice precisely that

makes him aware of his original freedom, because it is only there that
he knows himself as his true self.

From this point of view all the

other elements of freedom seem like mere preconditions to the manifes
tation of existential freedom.

Now, having recognized and adopted

those earlier elements, he sees the limits within which there confronts
him either a desperate sense of not being at all or an awareness of the
possibility of Existenz itself.
An existential choice does not result from a struggle of motives,
as has been already pointed out.

It is not a decision in which one

merely decides after performing some kind of calculation that has yielded
the correct result.

Nor is it obedience to an objectively phrased norm.

Rather, the crux of the choice is that the I. chooses.
In this choice I resolve to be myself in existence. Resolu
tion as such is not yet the rational will that makes me take
some finite action "resolutely," despite everything. Nor
does it lie in a heedlessly, blindly courageous existence.
Resolution is what comes to my will as the gift that in
willing I can really be— it is what I can will out of, with
out being able to will it. In resolution I plunge into free
dom, hoping at the bottom of it to meet myself, because I can ,
will. But what manifests my resolution is my concrete choice.
In this free choice the individual holds himself responsible for
himself, while from outside he is held responsible only for his actions
in their factuality.

^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 158-159.
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I know that I not only exist, that I not only am the way I
am and therefore act in that way, but that as I act and
decide I originate both my actions and the way I am. My
resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer
merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom
in which I can no longer separate the choice and me because
i 5™ this free choice. . . . What I am myself is left open,
of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent
I am not yet. But this not-being, in the sense of not-beingdefinitive in phenomenal existence, is illuminated by the
existential certainty of my being where I choose and thus
originate in resolution.
Nothing else will seem to an individual like real being once he
has experienced that original feeling that made him the fountainhead of
his own self.

If possible, he would like nothing in himself to remain

merely taken for granted.

He would like to merge completely with his

own choice, his own responsibility.

Rather than resign himself to what

is given in the objective world about him, his attitude will be one of
taking responsibility for it to the extent to which his freedom allows.
He knows there is no self-being when he denies his identity with his
historic existence, for in this self-identification alone lies the
potential for free choice and for unconditional commitment.
But unconditional commitment means leaving behind the delusive
freedom of remaining in the realm of endless possibilities.
want to become real by making a compelling decision.

He may not

Any choice, as

long as it has not been made, has something uncertain and therefore
disquieting about it.

It requires an assurance before it can be made.

Preceding this assurance there is a crisis of not knowing.

On the one

hand the fear when one cannot tell if it is the last try before stray
ing into nonbeing or, on the other, the moment of existential decision.

5Ibid., p. 160.
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Yet it is essential for the being of Existenz that there must be a deci
sion.
Either I decide as Existenz, or a decision will be made about
me, turning me into material for someone else and stripping me
of Existenz. Nothing remains unsettled. There is but a limited
margin of temporal possibility beyond which I cannot postpone a
decision without having it made about me rather than by me.
The steps leading to self-being are not one, however, but many.
They are made up of many small acts, unnoticeable in detail but on the
whole determining one's being.

One may resist decision by shutting'his

eyes because he does not want to will.

Fearful of his freedom to bind

himself by his own choice, he would like to shake off his responsibility
and let things happen.

Or, without any commotion, he may calmly and

just as unnoticeably go his way in small inner and outer actions which
strengthen his self-being through real decisions.

To welcome freedom

or to shun it, to accept responsibility for oneself or to shirk it,
whichever one chooses habitually determines the kind of being he is.

Conceptualizing Freedom
As regards stating the meaning of existential freedom in formal
terms, it must again be emphasized that no concept is capable of ade
quately expressing its nature.

It will be recalled that one cannot

realize this freedom without knowledge, nor without being aware of the
possibility of arbitrariness.

In addition, self-assured obedience to

an evident law and life viewed as a totality were likewise to be
regarded as necessary conditions for freedom to become a reality.

The

origin of existential freedom sets it in opposition to the superfici
ality of chance.

Existential necessity places it up against the

^Ibid., p. 161.
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arbitrary volition of the moment.

Responsibility and continuity, lastly,

pit existential freedom against obliviousness and flight.
What the elucidation of freedom begins and ends with,however,
is that it cannot be known as an object of empirical knowledge.

One can

only be certain of it for himself, not in thought but as Existenz, not
in pondering and asking about it, but in action.

Whatever one says

about freedom serves merely as a means of communication, issuing only
indirectly in any knowledge.
freedom; he acquires it.

Like freedom itself, conceptualizing freedom

is in a sense pure movement.
ize the sense of freedom.

It can be said that one does not possess

Thus no single expression can character

Only the movement from one concept to the

other will reveal a meaning that is not apparent in any one concept by
itself.
If I say "I choose" and my sense of decision covers freedom
proper, it still does not lie in arbitrary choice but in the
necessity I mean when I say "I will," in the sense of "I
must." Both terms assure Existenz of its original being as
distinct from empirical existence; both would allow it to
say, at that moment, "I am," and to mean free being. Only
together can all these expressions— I am, I must, I will, I
choose— be taken to express freedom. By itself, without
interpretation by the others, each of them would mean either
empirical existence or impulsive necessity or arbitrary psy
chological action. In the sense of freedom all elements are
so entwined as to make one source from the depths of which
those single elements spring as phenomenal forms: there is
no choice without decision, no decision without a will, no
will without necessity, no necessity without being."7

Freedom in Relation to Existence,
to Necessity, to Transcendence
Freedom has relevance and significance solely for self-becoming
or Existenz.

In the external world being is objective and comes within

7Ibid., p. 163.
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the domain of empirical knoxtfledge.

But in this cognition there is not

yet freedom, even though Existenz can only he free within the framexrork
of temporal existence.

Secondly, what merely happens within the con

text of the empirical order is not free.

It is caused or determined by

necessity, since it is subject to the physical laws of cause and effect.
Yet freedom finds scope for its exercise precisely either in opposition
to necessity or in union with it.
no longer any freedom.

Finally, in Transcendence there is

However, freedom remains the lever by which

Transcendence acts on Existenz, but only as that Existenz is its inde
pendent self.

These three relationships of freedom to existence,

necessity and Transcendence will now be further elaborated to derive
their full import for existential elucidation.
At the moment in one's existence xxrhen he begins to ask about
freedom, it may seem to him that he had always been potentially free.
His own ability to ask and decide lights up the possibility of being
responsible for himself.

Jaspers sees two equally original xrays in

Xtfhich one is struck by the question of freedom.

In the first he sees

himself sinking into a bottomless void when he cannot reconcile free
dom with his situation in the world.

But as he ax^akens to freedom,

he aligns himself again with his unique historical setting which he
cannot and will not betray or discard.

Or the possibility of unfree

dom X'/hich seemed already behind him, looms before him again with fresh
urgency.

It occurs to him that there may be no freedom at all.

Per

haps freedom was a delusive notion of something that does not exist.
And his own responsibility, without which he can no longer be himself,
was perhaps too only a phantom.

Struck by the possibility of absolute

unfreedom, he is shaken to the depths of his being.

Unsure of freedom,
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he seeks to prove to himself that it does exist.

If it does not suffice

for him to be simply aware of freedom without knowing it, he will try to
regain it in an objective fashion. The thoughts to which this leads will
fail in themselves, but in failing and by contrast, they will much more
decisively cast him back upon that true freedom about which the initial
questioning arose.
There can be no freedom outside self-being since the objective
world has neither a place nor an opening for it.
because he does not know.

The being which is inaccessible to knowledge

can be revealed only to one's volition.
ing to will.

One wills, moreover,

Not knowing is the root of hav

And Jaspers adds,

This is the passion of Existenz: that its not knowing is not
an absolute agony because it wills in freedom. The thought
of an inescapable unfreedom would plunge me into despair at
the fact of not knowing. The roots of freedom exclude it
from the existence I explore; what rests on freedom is the
being which I myself can be in existence.^
Each manifestation of freedom becomes meaningful insofar as each
is opposed to the limitations of a necessity that either resists it, of
one that rules it as a law, or of one that is its cause.

A true sense

of freedom unfolds either in opposition to some form of necessity or in
union with it.

Taking into account first that manifestation which

becomes meaningful through a necessity which resists it, the following
considerations are decisive.

Freedom, although tending to make absolute

demands on the individual for the realization of self-being, is relative
as regards the world.

The free man is always confronting something that

is a given by nature, but a given that can mean to him either dependency
or resistance.

Moreover Jaspers remarks:

8Ibid., p. 167.
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In existential freedom I see myself between two necessities—
between the natural law, the irremovable resistance of reality,
and the moral law, the rigid form of a rule. I am in danger of
being crushed betx^een the two. Yet if I seek to escape them
instead of moving in both, in the closest proximity, my freedom
is bound to get lost in fantasies. A sense of freedom that
would place me wholly on my own would be untenable in such
radical independence.9
Freedom likewise may be manifested by its opposition to a neces
sity that is in a sense its cause.

One is free to choose, but by his

choice he binds himself, carries it out and takes the consequences.
What binds him is not the empirical reality xtfhich his actions made the
way it is, but the inner, self-creating step he took at the moment of
choice.

He became the xyay he willed himself to be.

Although in time

the possibility of change always remains, his being is noxy bound by
itself and yet still free.

But in each new choice there is an even

deeper necessity present,
. . . the one that lies in the feeling of "Here I stand; I
cannot do otherwise," as Luther put it— in other xyords, in
the feeling that "I must." It is with this feeling that
Existenz makes its most original decisions about freedom.
Here is the point where some strange turns of speech make
full sense: that man chooses the one needed thing, and
"free" choice is out of the question; that absolute free
dom is absolute necessity; that firmness in the right will
leave no choice. . . . Hence the risk of total commitment
at high points of decision; hence the impossibility of com
ing to a decision from outside myself, by way of reasons;
and hence, on the other hand, the profound certainty of an
original sense of Existenz in making the decision. u
Freedom’s relation to Transcendence appears chiefly in the dual
modes of dependence and independence, and in viewing Transcendence as
both source and limitation of freedom.

There are two possibilities

regarding the question of man's ultimate dependence or independence,

9rbid., p. 169.

10Ibid., p. 171.
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according to Jaspers.

In one he is entirely dependent.

He has been

cast into existence by a deity, and his will is not his own.
would be of no help to him if this deity did not move it.

His will

But in last

analysis this gift of moving man's will is undeserved, and he upon whom
it is not bestowed is lost.

Although this alternative is perhaps over

stated by Jaspers and as such is not accepted as a viable possibility
by anyone, yet it clearly remains an utterly unacceptable one if free
dom is to retain anything of its true meaning.
In the other possibility one's sense of selfhood implicitly
denies that kind of dependence.

He is aware that he himself creates

his selfhood through his will, not all at once, but in the ongoing
actions of a lifetime.
I know that at the core I am independent, and it is from this
core that I relate to Transcendence— to a Transcendence that
has willed me to face it as a free man because I cannot other
wise be myself. I myself am responsible for my will, for my
actions, and for my original being.-'-1
Finally, freedom is poised in a dynamic polarity with Transcen
dence when this Transcendence is seen as both source and limitation of
existential freedom.

Jaspers expresses this polarity in the form of a

powerful antinomy.
Transcendence made me possible Existenz— in other words it made
me free in temporal existence. To choose freedom and indepen
dence from every structure of this world, to decide against any
authority, does not mean to decide against Transcendence. It
is before Transcendence that the man who is entirely on his own
will most radically experience the necessity that puts him
together into the hand of his God. . . . Having done something,
for instance, I may know: I could not do this alone, and I
could not do it again. If it was my true self that willed, it
was simultaneously given to me in my freedom.^2

n ibid. , p. 173.
12Ibid., p. 174.
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To summarize, this chapter has dealt with the central concept
of existential freedom.

First it took up the problem of free will,

since it is through the will that freedom comes to be realized. Next,
it considered the question of conceptualizing freedom from several
vantage points.

Freedom as knowledge, arbitrary act and as law were

viewed as its necessary conditions.

Then a consideration of freedom

as idea, choice and responsibility showed how these touched on the
essential nature of freedom.

Lastly, after an attempt to state free

dom in conceptual terms, it was further elucidated by seeing it in
relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICITY:

CONFINEMENT AND BREADTH OF EXISTENZ

Introduction

Existential freedom brings about the unfolding of Existenz
solely within the context of a historicity which at once confines and
at the same time opens up limitless possibility for self becoming.
in order to derive its full significance

But

for the becoming of Existenz,

Jaspers places the concept of historicity within the broader context of
what he terms boundary situations.

Viewed within this framework, his

toricity as the first boundary situation makes one aware of the singu
lar constraint of one's own individual data.

At the same time this

very constraint allows for the possibility of an uncertain future.
The uncertainty arising out of this boundary situation is such that
what is left to be determined by oneself still lies ahead, while
one's freedom finds its scope by assuming given facts and making
them one's own as if they had been his will.

It is in view of these

considerations that this chapter will first develop the concept of
historicity within the framework of a boundary situation.

Then it

will apply the consequences of this conceptual development to exis
tential self-becoming by showing historicity as both confinement and
breadth of Existenz.
When Jaspers speaks of historicity he is thinking of each
human being as a noninterchangeable body in space, limited in his
v

40

41
possibilities of location.

He is a being confined by others'existence

to which he relates in one way or another.

He may move toward that

existence or reject it, fight it or use it, succumb to it or be des
troyed by it.

He comes and goes in time, spending his life in unrest

or at least in ceaseless activity.

Finding himself in a world of inex

haustible possibilities, it is within them that he brings forth a world
of his own.

Within this temporal existence, and only within it, does

authentic self-being become possible.

"For me as temporal existence,

historicity is the one mode of access I have to absolute b e i n g . A n d
Existenz becomes aware of its utterly concrete space-bound and timebound existence, its historicity, through what Jaspers calls historic
consciousness.

Briefly stated, "Historic consciousness is the lucid,

2

factual historicity of Existenz in existence.”

Historicity as a Boundary Situation
When placed within the perspective of boundary situations, a
sense of historicity confers an absolute significance on existence, as
grasped by self-being, and at the same time keeps it in suspension and
relative, as mere existence.

For Existenz to be caught up in this

tension is what Jaspers means by historicity.

And he further clari

fies this tension by a consideration of historicity as a polarity of
Existenz and existence, determinacy and freedom, time and timelessness.
First, this vital balance between Existenz and existence is
disturbed when one's existence becomes absolute to him to the extent
that he no longer sees it as limited empirical existence.

■^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 107.
2Ibid., p . 105.
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happen, among other ways, if he does not freely face an environment he
feels unable to cope with.

Or, if he is living only on the level of

the senses as if there were nothing else to life.

But even these situ

ations can give rise to Existenz if he confronts them as an existence
that has a meaning that transcends itself.

They will lose their

restraining force as he freely adopts existence as his historic
determinacy.
Regarding the polarity betxtfeen determinacy and freedom it can
be stated that, in historic consciousness, situations described as
determined likewise appear to the individual as possibilities of free
dom.

A decision has been made whose outcome controls him, and at the

same time it is still up to him as long as he lives.

The decision once

made makes him feel inevitably determined, but the chance to make his
own decision makes him feel ultimately free.

When he looks at given

facts he is purely determined; when he looks at freedom, even defini
tive decisions are definitive only as he sees them now.

Although he

cannot reverse them by new decisions, he can direct their significance
by endowing them with a meaning yet unknown.

He can think of every

thing as taking place of necessity and regard himself as totally deter
mined in the way he is, and he can cover everything with freedom thereby
casting a ray of possibility on all definitive things.
If one is conscious of his Existenz, he does not see himself as
just empirically given.

His being appears to him as the possibility of

choice, rather, and as decision.

And yet, in this free origin he does

remain historic because he can never make a new beginning.

He must take

the consequences of decisions that lie far beyond anything he has con
sciously done, of decisions made even before he was born.

But the
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encompassing sense of historicity, the consciousness that there is no
given fact without freedom and no freedom without given facts, makes
him respect reality as such and at the same time keeps him boundlessly
ready to take every real thing and clothe it with possibility.

"The

sense of historicity keeps me close to reality because the necessity
in it freely guards the well from which I draw the meaning and the
O
substance of my actions."
Finally, "Existenz is neither timelessness nor temporality as
such.

It is one within the other, not one without the o t h e r . F o r

Existenz historicity implies an intensification of the moment, turning
the present into a fulfillment that contains past and future within
itself but which is not diverted to either.

This fulfillment is not

set as a future goal as if the present were a mere passing stage in
the service of things to come.

Nor is it set in the past as if the

preservation and repetition of past perfection were all that one
lives for.
product.

But Existenz does not appaar immediately as a finished
It is acquired step by step, by way of decisions taken in

the course of time.

Its phenomenal being is not in the single moment

but in the historic succession of interrelated moments.
In each of those the interrelation is felt: in waiting for
the exalted moment, refusing to waste myself; in relating a
lofty present to its premises, which I preserve and will not
betray; in continuing to live by the exalted moment, which
is past and yet remains my standard for the present.

3Ibid., p. 110.
^Loc. cit.
5Ibid., p. 111.
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Historicity as Confinement and Breadth of Existenz

As Confinement
At each moment the individual human exists by given data, and at
the same time he must confront given data by referring his will and his
actions to them.

This is how it comes about that he is a being for him

self as empirical existence, and how the concrete world to which he has
access exists for him as a given he can mold.

The concrete world, the

real situation, confines him by the fact that it resists him thereby
limiting his freedom and tieing him to restricted possibilities.
Jaspers envisions four different general forms of this resistance.
There is first the material which one uses.

Although it fits

the purpose he uses it for, it may be inadequate to itself since for
itself it may have another destiny.

Thus living things are consumed as

nutriment by other living things and people become mechanical functions
in a materialistic society.
vates.

Next one confronts the life which he culti

He creates conditions for the life he wants and he lets it grow.

The cultivated object is in a dependent state, however, though intended
in itself and not as material for something else.

It has no indepen

dence other than the one provided by the cultivator.
soul which he educates.

He faces third a

Training, habitual application, and instruction

prepare the ground for a freedom which is presently viewed as merely
possible.

In this freedom he confronts last another mind with which

he communicates.

Though unconditionally recognizing his independent

self-being, he seeks mutually his own being in the other.
sets forth the qualities of this fourth mode of resistance:

And Jaspers
"No limi

tations are established by any tacit purpose known to only one side.
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What counts is not persuasion but conviction, not suggestion but selfattained insight, not authority but accord."
One's unavoidable dependence on given facts of nature and on
the volition of others makes up the external features of historicity
insofar as it exercises a confining function in relation to Existenz.
This dependence is summed up by Jaspers in terms of the four general
forms of resistance.
Each of these definite things I face creates the situation
by resisting. The material balks; life develops differ
ently from my expectations; the soul opposes its own origin
to me, developing a mind of its oxm, a mind sustained by
the self-being of Existenz . . J

As Breadth
Once historicity, which seemed to be nothing but resistance and
confinement, is perceived as a boundary situation, it becomes the encom
passing breadth of Existenz itself.

But this breadth of Existenz is not

simply a given in historically definite situations nor in a sense of his
toricity as such.

To achieve it one has to have an existential aware

ness of his situation, to see it as a boundary situation.
existential awareness transferable.
can substitute for another.

Nor is this

At the source of Existenz no man

"Everyone owes to himself what he is."*
8

As Existenz the individual does not act in a world at large.
Yet, insofar as his historical situation contains aspects common to all
human beings, he goes on taking his bearings from such a world.

In

this activity he is not free in the sense of having eliminated the

8Ibid., p . 186.
^Loc. cit.
8Ibid., p. 187.
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resistance of material things and achieved full control over them, nor
in the sense of having eliminated incomprehension through perfect exis
tential communication.

No, he is free in the sense that Existenz is

able to transcend its own existence in the impetus arising out of a
lucid historical awareness.

As self-being he has the restless faculty

of choice, the possibility of ascertaining a truth that lies in his
singular and concrete situation.
When resistance is only partly surmounted by purposeful action,
its insurmountable aspect will reveal the boundary situation to poten
tial self-being.

By making use of the ideas of freedom as resistless

ness and as full accord, possible Existenz is achieved at the moment
when the definite, the accidental, that which might as well be differ
ent, is either freely assumed as suitable for oneself or rejected as a
reality in violation of one's own essence.

But the surpassing freedom

of Existenz remains the choice for which no rightness and no idea can
provide adequate reasons, the choice in which one either accepts or
rejects his historic existence as his own.
What has just been said has been an attempt to show that what
could at first be thought of as the limitation of one's finite existence
is in fact its possible phenomenal fulfillment.

What looked like mere

confinement for the idea of a world as the simple totality of existence
becomes the only reality for potentially unlimited Existenz.
It is in historicity that I clearly see the duplicity that
makes out the unity of my true sense of being: I am only
as temporal existence, and I myself am not temporal. I
know myself only as existence in time, but in such a way
that this existence becomes to me the phenomenon of my
timeless self-being.^

9Ibid., p. 107.
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The basic thrust of this chapter can be summarized in a single
statement.

Existential freedom is the primary source providing the

impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within the confines
of definite situations which limit at the same time as they open up
limitless possibility for that self-becoming.

Hoffman pinpoints the

function of freedom in this context when he states:

"Freedom becomes

real only in its bond with the body and with the world, while the
empirical order dips into subjectivity through its link with free
dom.""^

And Jaspers himself drives home the complementary role of

historicity in the context of the boundary situations as the former
relates to Existenz:

"As existence I am in situations; as possible

Existenz in existence I am in boundary situations. . . .

To experi

ence boundary situations is the same as Existenz."^

■^Kurt Hoffman, Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy, in
The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York:
Tudor, 1957), p. 102.

11Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, pp. 182, 179.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING

Introduction

"To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz.
This brief but powerful Jaspersian statement provides the capstone to
the content of the preceding four chapters.

Existential freedom has

emerged as the primal source giving the impetus for the realization
of Existenz, but only within the space- and time-bound situations
which confine at the same time as they open up unlimited possibility
for that self-realization.
It now remains to be seen what implications these existential
ideas contain for counseling theory and practice. Two implications
have already been stated in Chapter I.

The first is that the coun

selor recognizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to
effect freely his own selfhood, something he has first validated for
himself.

The second implication is that the counselee freely accepts

this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting
dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come
to himself in authentic self-being.

However, before examining these

implications in detail, it will be useful to consider the possible

•^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 179.
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CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING

Introduction

"To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz."'*'
This brief but powerful Jaspersian statement provides the capstone to
the content of the preceding four chapters.

Existential freedom has

emerged as the primal source giving the impetus for the realization
of Existenz, but only within the space- and time-bound situations
which confine at the same time as they open up unlimited possibility
for that self-realization.
It now remains to be seen what implications these existential
ideas contain for counseling theory and practice.
have already been intimated in Chapter I.

Three implications

First, Jaspers' concept of

existential freedom provides an adequate precondition for the becoming
of Existenz.

Second, the counselor recognizes the right and respon

sibility of the counselee to effect freely his own selfhood, something
he has first validated for himself.

Third, the counselee freely

accepts this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting
dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come
to himself in authentic self-being.

However, before examining these

implications in detail, it will be useful to consider the possible

■^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 179.
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philosophic frameworks for counseling.

Having done this, it should be

more readily seen what advantages the Jaspersian framework holds for
counseling theory and practice.

Possible Philosophic Frameworks
What has been written thus far has been based on a predis
position toward an existential and specifically Jaspersian philosophic
framework.

To answer the question as to the advantages of the Jaspers

ian construct over others requires a somewhat arbitrary selection
regarding their number and kind.

This writer proposes three struc

tural frames based on Carl Rogers' treatment of three ways of know
ing underlying the behavioral sciences, which would seem to include
counseling in its theory and process.
First, there is the subjective way of knowing.

This knowing

arises within the individual's own internal frame of reference.

In

Rogers' words,
Within myself . . . I may "know" that I love or hate, sense,
perceive, comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or
dislike, be interested in or bored by. These are all hypoth
eses, which we often check . . . by using the ongoing flow of
our preconceptual experiencing as a referent.^
Rogers illustrates his point by citing Gendlin on how subjective know
ing relates to psychotherapy.
Often an example of it in psychotherapy is the \<ray in which
the client searches and searches for the word that will more
accurately describe what he is experiencing, feeling, or per
ceiving. There is a sense of real relief when he discovers a
term which "matches" his experiencing, which provides a more

^Carl Rogers, Toward a Science of the Person (paper presented
for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for
Modern Psychology," Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963),
p. 3.
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sharply differentiated meaning for the vague knowing which
has been present, which permits him to be more congruent
within himself.^
According to Rogers, little attention was being given to the subjective
mode of knowing at the time at which he delivered his paper, because it
does not lead to publicly validated knowledge.

Yet he voiced the opin

ion that even the most rigorous science has its origin in this mode of
knowing.
When one tries to test these inner, subjective hypotheses by
checking with others or with the external environment, then he has
passed to the objective or second way of knowing.
In this type of knowing, the hypotheses are based upon an
external frame of reference, and the hypotheses are checked
both by externally observable operations, and by making
empathic inferences regarding the reactions of a trusted
reference group, usually of one's colleagues. . . . This
psychological process is the basis of all logical positiv
ism, operationalism, and the vast structure of science a^
we know it. Its achievements have been most impressive.
Such schools of counseling and psychotherapy as the behavioral and the
psychoanalytic likewise look to the objective way of knotting as their
theoretical foundation, and for that reason also depend on the identi
cal psychological process at the root of all objective knowing.
Certain characteristics of this approach have not been ade
quately understood.

As Rogers says,

Since it has had such vast importance, and since it has led
to such incredible technological advances, it is often for
gotten that it is not necessarily superior to the first, sub
jective way of knowing, and that in crucial instances, it

O
E. T. Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, p. 7,
in paper presented for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology:
Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology," by Carl Rogers (Rice Univer
sity, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963).
^Carl Rogers, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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bows to it. For example, the evidence for extrasensory per
ception is better than, or certainly as good as, the evidence
for many of the principles which psychologists believe. Yet,
with very few exceptions, psychologists reject this evidence
with vehemence.
It is not easy to impugn the methods which
have been used in studying ESP, for they are the same as
those used in any field of psychology. But the psychologist
falls back on his subjective knowing. The evidence does not
fit with the pattern of knowledge as he expects to find it,
does not fit with his experiencing of the world. Therefore
he rejects it. There have been many instances of this sort
in the history of science. . . . The reason for pointing
out these crucial uncertainties is to indicate the error of
the widespread notion that objective knowledge is "out there,"
firm, impersonal, and secure. Quite the contrary, it is a
very human invention— one of enormous value . . . but it is
none the less a fallible and human way of knowing.^
A third mode of knowing, called interpersonal knowing by Rogers,
is regarded by him to be somewhere in between the two types of knowing
already described.

This mode applies primarily to knoxvledge of human

beings and the higher organisms.

Rogers describes it pointedly in the

first person.
Here I "know" that you feel hurt by my remark, or that you
despise yourself, or that you have a strong desire to get
"to the top of the heap" . . . These knoxrlngs, like those
described before, are all hypotheses. But in these
instances, the way of checking these hypotheses is to use
whatever skill and empathic understanding is at my command
to get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological
field, to get inside your private world of meanings, and
see whether my understanding is correct. I may simply
bluntly ask you if my hypothesis is correct, but this is
often a very inadequate method of inferring your private
world. I may observe your gestures, words, inflections,
and base my inferences on these. Or I may— and here is
the essence of my experience in psychotherapy— create a
climate which makes it psychologically safe and reward
ing for you to reveal your internal frame of reference. 6

-*Ibid., pp. 9-10.
^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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Two criteria for this type of knowing are suggested by Rogers.
I believe the criteria are twofold; either my hypothesis
about the internal frame of reference of this individual
is confirmed by the individual himself, or the inferences
made about his internal frame of reference are confirmed
by a concensual validation. For example, I sense that you
are feeling unhappy this morning.
If I say, "Looks as
though your world is pretty dark this morning," and you by
word or nod show your agreement, then I have checked my
hypothesis and found that it has some validity. Another
method of checking would be that if I kept to myself my
empathic sensing of your unhappiness, but during the morn
ing three other individuals came to me independently to
speak of their concern over what seemed to them as your
sadness, your depression, and the like, then the probabil
ity of the correctness of the inference as to your inter
nal state would be greatly increased.7
Three ways of knowing have been described.

It now remains to

relate these modes to each other and to specific schools of psychologi
cal and counseling theory.

Having done this, it should then be possible

to point out the advantages for counseling theory the Jaspersian philo
sophic framework possesses over others.

In Rogers’ view the three modes

of knowing are three ways by which one extends knowledge, by which one
confirms or disconfirms the hypotheses one is continuously forming,
both as a part of everyday living and as a part of psychological
science.

He says further,

I would advance the view that any mature psychological science
uses each of these ways of knowing in appropriate relationship
to the other two, that it is only as these three modes of know
ing are adequately and appropriately interwoven that a satis
factory behavioral science can emerge. . . . I believe that
recent history shows us that we make a serious mistake when
we attempt to use one of these channels of knowing in isola
tion, without reference to the others. Thus the behaviorist
frequently regards himself as using only the objective mode
of knowing, and sees the other modes as objects of scorn, or
at least completely unnecessary to a developing science. Some
current existentialist thinkers, on the other hand, seem

7Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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equally passionate in rejecting the objective way of knowing,
relying entirely on the subjective and phenomenological way of
knowing. Another type of mistake is made when we confuse or
equate these very different modes of knowing. It is of the
utmost importance to be entirely clear as to the mode we are
using at any particular moment or in any particular enterprise.
When we become confused as to which avenue to knowledge is
being utilized, or attempt to equate the knowledge from these
three modes, serious trouble arises. Much psychoanalytic writ
ing exhibits this latter error to a painful degree.8
Rogers points with optimism to the fact that the so-called new
third force in psychology shows signs of being willing to use all three
of these channels to knowing for the advancement and enrichment of
science.

However, what he does not do, it seems to this writer, is to

provide a broad philosophic framework within which to situate these
admittedly rather comprehensive views of human knowing.

It is proposed

that this philosophic framework is to be found precisely in Jaspers'
concept of the encompassing.

Within this comprehensive construct, one

could relate Rogers' subjective knowing to Jaspers' mode of Existenz,
objective knowing to the mode of consciousness-at-large, and interper
sonal knowing to Jaspers' concept of existential communication.

The

logical question as to the advantage of the Jaspersian framework over
others requires further treatment and thus provides the principal
thrust of the second section of this chapter.

Jaspersian Concepts and Counseling
Returning to the mainstream of this study, it must now be asked
what are the implications for counseling theory of existential freedom
within the limitations as well as the potentialities deriving from one's
historicity.

It was stated earlier that these implications xrere

8Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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primarily twofold.

The proposal of this study, broad and comprehensive

in its scope, affirms that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom pro
vides an adequate precondition for self-becoming or Existenz.

Deriving

from this are two major implications bearing directly on the counseling
relationship.

The first affects primarily the counselor's attitude

toward the counselee; the second, the counselee's response to this
attitude, together with its significance for the latter.

These topics

will now be considered in more detail.
That the Jaspersian concept of existential freedom embodies
the indispensable prerequisite to the self-being of Existenz in the
context of its historicity, follows from the essential movement of
Chapters III and IV.

This movement is epitomized in the concluding

paragraph of Chapter IV.
Existential freedom is the primary source providing the
impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within
the confines of definite situations which limit at the
same time as they open up limitless possibility for that
self-becoming.9
Here existential freedom is regarded as the origin, and historicity
as both limitation and breadth, of self-becoming.

Since this theme

has already been dealt with at some length, further elaboration would
seem redundant.
However, further delineation of the implications of existen
tial freedom for the counseling relationship seems necessary.

First,

the counselor will recognize the right and responsibility of the coun
selee to his own free self-determination and self-becoming, provided
the counselor has already validated this freedom for himself.

Second,

^C. Ries, "Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existen
tial Philosophy" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
North Dakota, 1973), p. 47.
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the counselee will respond to the counselor's attitude toward him by
progressively assuming responsibility for his own Existenz, and by
gradually rejecting dependence on the counselor as he grows in selfawareness and authentic self-being.

This reciprocity of potential

ity and exigency inherent in the very nature of existential freedom
appears evident from all that has been said in Chapter III concern
ing that central concept.

Finally, Jaspers himself, when referring

explicitly to the therapist-client relationship, seems to attest to
this same essential idea.
Therefore what is left as the ultimate thing in the doctorpatient relationship is existential communication, which
goes far beyond any therapy, that is, beyond anything that
can be planned or methodically staged. The whole treatment
is thus absorbed and defined within a community of two
selves who live out the possibilities of Existenz itself,
as reasonable beings. For example, there are no rules
deriving from some supposed assessment of the individual
as a whole, which determine whether the person shall con
ceal or reveal; nor is the whole thing quite fortuitous,
as if the person might listen to everything and then be
left to his own devices. One questions and gropes from
one freedom to another x^ithin the concreteness of the
actual situation, taking no responsibility for the other
nor making any abstract demands. . . . The doctor is not
a pure technician nor pure authority, but Existenz itself
for its oxim sake, a transient human creature like his
patient.^
It should be pointed out that Jaspers is speaking here of the possible
final or ultimate step in the therapeutic relationship.

At the same

time he presupposes an entire series of stages of therapeutic activ
ity, each of which builds upon and succeeds the one preceding it.
Much of what has been said or implied regarding the counseling
relationship has had to do xd_th its possibilities.

Nevertheless, this

-*-^Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, trans. by J. Hoenig
and M. W. Hamilton (Manchester, England: University Press, 1963),
pp. 788-789.
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relationship likewise has its limitations, and these are insurmountable,
according to Jaspers.

First of all, therapy cannot be a substitute for

something that only life itself can bring.
For instance, we can only become transparently ourselves
through a lifetime of loving communication in the course
of a destiny shared with others. . . . A professional per
formance constantly repeated on behalf of many never reaches
the goal which only engagement in mutuality can attain. Fur
ther, life brings responsible tasks, perforce, and there are
the real demands of work which no therapy hox^ever artful can
contrive. ^
The second limitation is,
A person is originally thus and no other and therapy finds
itself confronted with this factor which it cannot alter.
I in my freedom may confront this fact that I am thus and
no other, confront it as something I may change or at least
transform through acceptance, but any therapy of others has
to reckon with unalterable elements, the mark of some last
ing essence, something inborn. . . . The therapeutic atti
tude can only retain its integrity if it accepts that funda
mentally .
These limitations intrinsic to the counseling relationship bring the
individual back to the sober realization that he, and ultimately he
alone, must assume full responsibility for his own freedom and selfbecoming.
This final chapter has been an attempt to outline the implica
tions for counseling theory of the key existential concepts of freedom
and historicity.

First, the advantages of the Jaspersian model of

counseling were considered.

Then the implications of existential

freedom for the individual person
were set forth.

and for the counseling relationship

Finally, some limitations of the counseling relation

ship were indicated.

Jaspers seems to synthesize the central theme

-^ I b i d . , p . 804.

12Loc. cit.
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of the entire study in these words:
. . . in therapy the widest polarities lie in whether the
doctor turns to what can be discovered by science, that is
to the biological event, or whether he turns to the freedom
of man. A mistake is made about the whole of human life,
should the doctor in looking at persons let them be sub
merged in the biological event; so too, should he convert
human freedom into that sort of being which, like nature,
is empirically there and can be used technically as an
instrument of therapy. Life I can treat, but to freedom
I can only appeal. ^-3

l-%.arl Jaspers, op. cit., p. 800.
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